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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell October 29, 1985 
From: Anne 
No. 84-1184, New York v. Class 
(cert. to N.Y. Ct. App.) (argument November 4, 1985) 
Question Presented 
Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit a police officer, who 
has lawfully stopped an automobile for a traffic violation, from 
inspecting the vehicle identification number ("VIN") unless the 
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the automobile is 
stolen? 
Background 
This case concerns the Fourth Amendment implications of 
police inspection of VIN's. The VIN is a serial number that, 
under mandatory federal and state regulatory schemes, must be 
''l' 
2. 
affixed by manufacturers to motor vehicles that will operate in 
the United States. The VIN provides a reliable means by which to 
identify a particular vehicle. In coded form, it identifies 
manufacturer, make, model, body type, engine type, country of 
manufacture, year of manufacture, plant of manufacture, year of 
production, and production number sequence of the specific 
vehicle. For all cars produced during 1969 or later, a "public" - ll ....___ 
VIN must be affixed on the left side of the top of the dashboard 
and be viewable through the windshield. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.115 
....... ..... .... .-z 
(S 4.6). In older cars, the public VIN ordinarily was placed on 
the door jamb of the driver's-side front door. Or the public VIN 
may be engraved on the engine. In addition to the public VIN, 
all vehicles carry a "confidential" VIN affixed in an obscure 
location, the position of which ordinarily is known only by the 
manufacturer and police. By comparing the public with the 
confidential VIN, police can determine if the vehicle bears an -
illegally transferred or altered VIN plate. 
~-----
Petr New York State describes why police want to inspect 
the VIN. The VIN is the most effective and reliable means for \~ 
achieving positive identification of a particular vehicle. When 
-------------------------------------------------police stop a vehicle engaged in a traffic or safety violation, 
they have an interest in identifying not only the driver 
responsible for the violation but also in identifying the vehicle 
involved. Because the appearance of a car can be altered with 
paint and with transfer of license plates, the V IN may be the 
only method to identify the car. Moreover, the police cannot 
ascertain if the vehicle is properly registered unless they may 
3. 
inspect the V IN. This is so because the registration document 
sets forth the VIN. Thus, to decide if the automobile is 
properly registered, officers must compare the actual V IN with 
the number contained on the registration document. Similarly, 
the card showing that the automobile is insured must be displayed 
to officers on a traffic violation stop. That card relies on the 
VIN as the basis for establishing that the particular vehicle is 
insured. In short, law enforcement has an interest in inspecting 
the VIN in order to determine if a vehicle is stolen. 
Two police officers observed resp driving five to ten 4 
miles per hour above the speed limit in a car with a cracked 
windshield. The officers instructed resp to pull over. Resp 
obeyed, emerged from his car, and approached the officer driving 
the pol ice car • Resp gave this officer his registration and 
proof of insurance, and stated that he had no driver's license in 
his possession. Meanwhile, the other officer had approached 
resp's car, opened the door, and inspected the left door jamb for 
the VIN. Since the VIN was not located there, the officer 
reached into the car and moved papers located on the dashboard in 
order to view the VIN. In doing so, the officer saw a gun 
protruding from beneath the driver's seat, seized it, and 
arrested resp. 
Resp moved in the TC to suppress the gun. The TC denied 
the motion. Though the officers had no reason to believe that the 
1/ ,, 
car was stolen, the TC believed that their action was reasonable -
in ~ight of resp's conduct in immediately exiting his ~ar and in --
light of the fact that resp had no license in his possession. 
4. 
N.Y. Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. One judge 
dissented, finding the "search" impermissible because "there was 
absolutely no predicate for believing the car was stolen." 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed. The court 1tf11A 
concluded that, on the facts of this case, the officer conducted 
a search of resp • s car. The Fourth Amendment "protects people 
from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate 
expectations of privacy." United States v. Chadwick, 433 u.s. 1, 
7. A person has no such expectation in locations of his car 
exposed to the view of passersby. Thus, there would have been no 
search had the officer merely peered inside resp's car. Texas v. 
Brown, 103 S.Ct. 1535. But a person does have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in areas of a car that cannot be viewed 
from the outside. Here, the government intrusion accomplished by 
the officer who opened the car door and reached inside was 
undertaken "to obtain information" and "exposed these hidden 
areas." Therefore, the intrusion constituted a search. 
N.Y. ct. App. then turned to the question of whether the 
search was justified. The court observed that lesser 
justification than probable cause might be sufficient to support 
police inspection of VIN's. This was so because a VIN inspection 
is ordinarily less intrusive than a full-blown search and because 
the police have a compelling interest in positive identification 
of vehicles. The court did not decide this issue for here there Jtq 
was(gi' ~~ion ~~ The TC decided that ~ 
the search was reasonable because resp got out of his car and he ~ 
had no license. But a driver's 
l 
~*-"' emergence from his car upaf1 c~4
(___...;> 
5. 
being stopped by the police did not suggest criminal activity. 
And the officer who searched for the VlN was not aware, at the 
r~ . 
time he did so, that resp lacked a license. The sole pred1cate 
for the VlN search was resp's ncommission of an ordinary traffic 
infraction.n ln the view of N.Y. Ct. App., that offense did not --justify the VlN inspection.n 
opinion suggests that the court 
My reading of N.Y. Ct. App.'s } 
would require that officers have Yt1 
nreasonable suspicionn 
inspect the V!N. 
that 
IJUW' 
a car is stolen before they may 
Finally, N.Y. Ct. App. noted that some lower court 
decisions in New York had construed section 401 of the state 
Vehicle and Traffic Law as authorizing VlN inspections. N.Y. Ct. 
App. rejected those decisions. Section 401 authorized police to 
demand inspection of the V lN. lt did not authorize police to 
intrude into a car without the driver's consent. 
Two judges dissented. Once a car is on the highway, its ------owner has no expectation of privacy in the VlN. The purpose of 
the VlN is to proclaim the identity of the vehicle, a purpos 
that is inconsistent with the owner's privacy interests. 
other hand, the police have a compelling interest in positiv 
identification of motor 'vehicles. Concepts of probable cause 
should have no application where the purpose of the police 
inspection was only to identify the vehicle, not to seize 
physical evidence in connection with suspected criminal activity. 
The dt' s : n: ing jug wo: ld hold _that, where the police are 
justified in making a traffic stop, they are authorized to 
inspect the VlN. 
6. 
Discussion 
1. Adequate and Independent State Grounds 
Before reaching the merits of this case, the Court must 
consider resp's threshold argument that the decision of N.Y. Ct. 
App. rests on "adequate and independent state grounds." Because 
it seems likely that the Court considered and rejected this 
contention at the time it decided to grant cert., my discussion 
of this point will be brief. The leading case on how to 
determine if a state court decision rests on "adequate and 
v 
independent state grounds" is Michigan v. Long, 463 u.s. 1032 
(1983). 
In Long, the Court stated that, when "a state court 
decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to 
be interwoven with federal law, and when the adequacy and 
independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from 
the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable 
explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did 
because it believed that federal law required it to do so." !d. 
at 1040-41. Of course, if a state decision clearly states that 
it is "alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and 
independent grounds," the Court will not undertake to review it. 
The Court adopted this approach in order to obviate the necessity 
to examine state law to decide the nature of the state decision 
and to avoid the intrusive practice of requiring state courts to 
clarify the grounds for their decisions. In short, my reading 
of Long is that the adequacy and independence of the state ground 
must be "plain" on the face of the state decision. In Long, the 
7. 
Court concluded that the state decision did not rest on state 
grounds; apart from two citations to the state constitution, the 
decision relied exclusively on federal law. 
In this case, N.Y. Ct. App. stated that the search 
violated the federal and state constitutions. Moreover, the 
court, unlike the state court in Long, did cite some state 
decisions to support its conclusion. But the decision discusses 
only the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution, using the 
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis developed in the 
federal case law. Thus, while I do not think that it is as clear 
in this case, as it was in Long, that the state court rested 
decision primarily on federal law, the state decision certainly 
is "interwoven" with federal law and contains no "plain 
statement" that it rests on adequate and independent state 
grounds. 
In his brief, resp gives an analysis of the state cases 
cited by N.Y. Ct. App. in order to show that its decision rests 
on adequate and independent grounds. But my reading of Long 
suggests that this sort of inquiry into state law is precisely 
what Long was designed to avoid. Instead, the adequacy and 
independence of the state grounds must be reflected on "the face 
of the opinion." 463 u.s. 1040-41. 
II. The Merits 
I believe that the appropriate resolution of this case l/~ 
depends largely on two decisions of thi~urt. These decisions~ 
demonstrate that th~er's conduct does implicate Fourth~ 
Amendment concerns and that, therefore, it is necessary to apply lAM }.I 
~C.II..- ~ 
8. 
to this case Fourth Amendment principles as they have been 
developed in the context of motor vehicles. Before turning to 
the recent decisions, I will discuss the governing Fourth 
Amendment principles as applied to automobiles. 
-------------------------~ The Fourth Amendment protects "the privacy and security 
of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government 
officials." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 u.s. 364, 377 (1976) 
(Powell, J. , concurring) • As in every Fourth Amendment case, 
resolution of the question presented here "requires a weighing of 
the governmental and societal interests advanced to justify such 
intrusions against the constitutionally protected interest of the 
individual citizen in the privacy of his effects." Id. at 378. 
The Court has recognized that individuals do have an expectation 
of privacy in their automobiles, but that such expectation is 
"limited." Two factors have been identified to justify the 
conclusion that a person's expectation of privacy in his 
automobile is entitled to less protection than such expectation ~ 
in, for example, his home. 
First, cars, unlike homes, "are subjected to pervasive 
and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including ~ 
~
periodic inspection and licensing requirements." South Dakota 
v. Opperman, 428 u.s. at 368. Thus, as a routine, ever:;J'/;'-'~ 
occurrence, "police stop and examine" vehicles when they obser~ 
traffic, registration, or safety i_I)fractions. Id. Second, the 
expectation of priv-t1cy with respect to automobiles is "further 
diminished by the obviously public nature of automobile travel." 
Id. Moreover, the Court has pointed out that expectation of 
9. 
privacy in the passenger compartment of a car is diminished 
because that compartment is "relatively open to plain view." 
California v. Carney, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2069 (1985). This 
diminished expectation of privacy, combined with the mobility of 
automobiles, led the Court to recognize the "automobile ~ 
exception" to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Under the 
~J-~ 
governing pri~ therefore, you must 
inspectio~at occurred in this case was 
Id. 
decide if the VIN 
"reasonable." Reasonableness, in turn, requires you to weigh the 
public interest in law enforcement against resp' s interest in 
being free of governmental intrusion. Two facts in this case 
are important. ~' the police had properly stopped resp for 
traffic and safety infractions. Therefore, the initial stop, 
which is clearly subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, was 
proper. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 u.s. 106, 109 (1977) (per 
curiam). ~' the further intrusion was conducted in 
connection with the VIN, which is part of the pervasive 
governmental regulation of vehicles that has led the Court to 
recognize a diminished expectation of privacy in motor vehicles. 
With these facts in mind, I will briefly describe two decisions 
of this Court that suggest that the VIN inspection was ------------------- -reasonable. 
In Deleware v. Prouse, 440 u.s. 650 (1979), the Court 
held that, "except in those situations in which there is at least 
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is 
unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that 
10. 
either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure 
for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the 
driver in order to check his driver's license and the 
registration of the automobile are unreasonable under . the Fourth 
Amendment." Id. at 663 (emphasis added). In other words, the 
police do not have unbridled discretion to select cars at random 
for inspection of license and registration. But, under my 
reading of the case, police may check license and registration 
documents when they have stopped a vehicle for a traffic 
violation even in the absence of suspicion that the driver lacks 
such documents. As the Court stated, "Vehicle stops for traffic 
violations occur countless times each day; and on these 
occasions, licenses and registration papers are subject to (P~ 
inspection and drivers without them will be ascertained." Id. at 
~ --------------------~------------------------------------659. The Court did observe that "drivers without licenses" will 
probably be stopped more often for traffic infractions because 
they are presumably "the less · safe drivers." But the Court's 
concern was that police discretion in deciding whom to stop 
should not be unbridled in light of the substantial intrusion of 
the stop on individual rights. 
In this case, the officers' discretion with respect to 
.__ __ ___... 
their initial decision to stop resp's car was properly exercised. 
That is, they stopped resp, not on a random hunch, but because he 
was engaged in traffic and safety infractions. I have no doubt 
that the officers were then, under Delaware v. Prouse, entitled 
to inspect re~p's license and registration papers. If they could 
inspect those- papers, it is difficult to understand why they 
11. 
could not also inspect the VIN. Like the license and 
regi-stration, the V IN is a part of the regula tory scheme 
~-----------------~-------
for ~ 
motor vehicles that police have a legitimate interest in 
~
enforcing. I am unable to discern a meaningful distinction 
between inspection of license and registration papers and 
inspection of a VIN except for the fact that VIN inspection does 
involve an additional intrusion. '!'hat is, to inspect the VIN, 
police must peer through the windshield, inspect the door jamb, 
or open the hood and examine the engine. I believe that the 
reasoning in ~nsylvania v. Mimms, 434 u.s. 106 ( 1977) (per (2~C:. 
curiam) , suggests that such intrusion is not necessarily 
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, two police officers observed 
defendant driving a car with an expired license plate. '!'he 
officers stopped the car to issue a traffic summons. An officer 
approached and asked defendant to get out of his car and to 
produce his license and registration. When defendant complied, 
the officer noticed a bulge beneath his jacket. Fearing that the 
bulge might be a gun, the officer frisked defendant and found a 
revolver. '!'he portion of the Court's reasoning that I believe is 
most relevant to this case relates to the officer's order that 
defendant get out of his car. 
First, the Court observed that the case raised no 
questions concerning the propriety of "the initial rest:r..-ictions 
on [defendant's] freedom of movement." '!'he officers properly 
stopped him for an infraction of the state's motor vehicle code. 
Second, the Court considered the question of whether "the order 
12. 
to get out of the car, issued after the driver was lawfully 
detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment." !d. at 109. The Court focused "on the incremental 
intrusion resulting from the request to get out of the car once 
the vehicle was lawfully stopped." !d. The dfficer had adopted 
the practice of ordering all drivers to get out of their cars 
even though he had no reason to believe that the driver was 
dangerous. He did this as a precautionary measure to reduce the 
possibility that the driver could make unobserved movements. The 
Court concluded that this safety justification was both 
"legitimate and weighty." On the other side of the balance, the 
Court weighed the intrusion occasioned by the order to get out of 
the car and concluded that this "additional intrusion," beyond J 
minimis." the intrusion caused by the lawful stop, was "de 
Asking the driver to get out of his car and expose to view little 
more than would be exposed if he remained in the car was at "most 
a mere inconvenience" when balanced against the state's 
legitimate safety concerns. Finally, the Court decided that, 
upon observing the bulge, the officer was entitled to frisk the 
defendant. 
In this case, one must focus on the incremental 
intrusion, beyond that occasioned by the lawful stop, caused by ___...... 
the VIN inspection. The incremental intrusion in this case 
consists of the officer's action in opening the car door, 
inspecting the door jamb for the VIN, and then reaching into the 
car to move papers on the dashboard to reveal the V IN plate. 
While the nature of the intrusion in this case is different from 
13. 
that involved in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, I tend to think that the 
intrusion is reasonable. 
First, it is necessary to consider the public interest j ~ 1/a.- I 
in law enforcement served by VIN inspection. Based on petr's 
discussion of the function of the VIN, which resp does not appear 
. . h 1 .. ~~~t' to d1spute, 1t seems that the State as a eg1t1mate 1n~eres 1n 
permitting police to view the VIN. Unless police do so, they are 
not certain that registration or insurance documents accurately 
reflect the status of the vehicle. Moreover, stolen cars do pose 
a~em, and inspection of the VIN permits the police 
to ascertain if a vehicle involved in a traffic violation has 
been stolen. 
Second, it is necessary to weigh the interest of the 
individual against the State's interest. Though the driver 
clearly has an expectation of privacy in his car, that 
--------------~ 
expectation is limited. Significantly, the driver does not 
appear to have any expectation of privacy in the VIN itself. The 
VIN is placed on the car to identify it; implementation of the 
regulatory scheme depends on official inspection of the VIN. 
While inspection of the VIN may in some cases (such as where the 
police must inspect the door jamb) expose to view areas that 
would not otherwise be exposed, inspection~he VIN does not 
require a full-blown search of the car. Rather, because the VIN 
is known to be affixed only in particular locations, police 
intrusion will be limited to those 
view, the VIN inspection is less 
approved in Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 
... 
locations. in my \ 
conduct l 
My own feeling as a driver 
Finally, 
intrusive than the 
14. 
is that an official order to get out of my car is more intrusive 
than an order to open the car door to permit VIN inspection. 
I believe that the balance in this case tips in favor of 
the State interest in inspecting the VIN. I feel a bit hesitant 
about this conclusion because I treasure the interests secured by 
the Fourth Amendment. But, in light of Deleware v. Prouse and 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, my balancing of the interests leads me to 
conclude that police may, upon a lawful stop of a motor vehicle 
for traffic violations, inspect the VIN. 
issue. 
The CAs have reached ~nfli~ecis~ on this 
In my view, none of the decisions provides a wholly 
satisfactory framework of analysis. Some of the CAs have ruled 
that inspection of the VIN is not a "search" within the meaning 1)'2..cf-
of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Kitowski :? ~ 
729 F.2d 1418 @ 1984); United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d)~ 
446, 454-55 ~980). That conclusion is not satisfactory for 
it suggests that VIN inspection implicates no Fourth Amendment 
concerns. A holding that a VIN inspection is not a "search" 
suggests that there are no limits on police discretion in 
selecting vehicles for VIN inspection. As I discuss above, I 
---------...... 
believe that the Fourth Amendment does restrict police authority 
to inspect VINs. Moreover, many of the cases holding that a VIN 
inspection is not a search also state that, even if the 
inspection was a search, the search was reasonable for the facts 
of the case gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the car was 
stolen or being used for criminal activity. See , e.g • , United 
States v. Forrest, supra; United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 
... 
15. 
1309, 1313 (CAS 1978). Thus, these decisions do not provide 
useful analysis in a case where the officers have properly 
stopped a car for a traffic infraction but lack any basis to 
believe that the car was stolen. 
On the other hand, a decision of CAlO holds that a 
warrantless intrusion into a car to inspect a VIN violated the 
Fourth Amendment. See Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 
(CAl 0 1965) • Where the pol ice seek to inspect the V IN of a 
vehicle not otherwise subject to seizure, they should be required 
to justify their action on the basis of at least a reasonable 
suspicion that the vehicle is stolen or being used for criminal 
activity. But, in this case, resp's car was subject to seizure 
for traffic violations. At that point, the question becomes for 
me the extent to which the additional intrusion occasioned by VIN 
inspection can be said to outweigh the police interest in such 
inspection. 
While it does not rest on the precise facts presented -
here, the most persuasive CA decision on VIN inspection is United f.1~t 
~ ,.........._,_._ 
States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 374 @ 1971). In that case, CA4 ~ 
held that "when there is a legitimate reason to identify a motor --vehicle, inspection of its confidential number is not an 
unreasonable search." CA4 decided that a VIN inspection is 
subject to the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment. But the 
court noted that the mobility of cars makes them attractive to 
criminals: cars are frequently stolen and are often used as 
instruments of crime. Police have an interest in checking the 
VIN expeditiously before a car is moved. Though a person has an 
; 
16. 
expectation of privacy in his vehicle, he has no expectation of 
privacy in identification of the vehicle. And search of that 
part of the vehicle displaying the VIN but a minimal invasion 
of a person's privacy ... Accordingly, olice should be freer to 
inspect the VIN than they are to searc for private property. On 
the facts of the case before it, CA4 concluded that police had a 
legitimate reason to search for the confidential VIN because they 
noticed that the public VIN was missing from the doorpost. CA4 
declined to say what other circumstances would supply police with 
a legitimate reason to inspect a VIN. In my view, this reasoning 
is sound and can be extended to the facts of this case. Here, 
police properly had stopped resp for a traffic violation; they 
had a legitimate interest in identifying the vehicle involved in 
the violation; intrusion for the purpose of locating the VIN is 
limited. 
While I believe that the above discussion resolves the 
issue raised in this case, I would like to make the following 
additional points. ______., 
(1} Though petr New York State agrees that police could 
not arbitrarily select vehicles for a VIN inspection, petr relies 
on the CA cases holding that a VIN inspection is not a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amerldment. Petr emphasizes 
the driver's lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
VIN, but ignores the fact that a driver does have an expectation 
of privacy m----his car, -which is the area into which police must 
intrude in orde...r;.. to inspect the V IN. As I note above, this 
argument should be rejected for it suggests that police 
... :t· 
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inspection of the VIN implicates no Fourth Amendment concerns 
whatsoever. This point may be more semantic than real, but I 
believe that a holding that VIN inspection is not a "search" for 
Fourth Amendment purposes could lead to doctrinal incoherence. 
Rather, the Court should hold that VIN inspection is an intrusion 
subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions and then engage in the 
traditional balancing of interests outlined in Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms. 
(2) Petr argues that the inspection was justified on the 
ground that resp had no driver's license. The argument boils 
down to the assertion that, because he was unlicensed, resp had 
virtually no expectation of privacy in the passenger compartment 
of the car. Petr's contentions in this connection are not 
entirely unconvincing. For example, petr points out that police 
must prevent the unlicensed driver from continuing to operate the 
vehicle and must impound the vehicle. These steps will require 
the police to intrude into the interior of the car. But if you 
agree with my balancing of interests, you need not reach this 
argument. On this record, it would be better not to do so for two 
reasons. First, adoption of the argument might be impeded by a 
factual problem. Resp points out that the officer who inspected 
the VIN was not aware at the time he did so that resp had no 
license. Accordingly, the Court would have to impute the 
knowledge of the officer who requested license and registration 
to the officer who inspected the V IN. Second, adoption of the 




resolve the issue in this case. This argument was not raised in 
N.Y. Ct . App. 
(3) Petr invites the Court to decide a question left 
open in Michigan v. Long, 463 u.s. 1032 (1983). In that case, 
the Court held that police could search the passenger compartment 
of a car for weapons "as long as they possess an articulable and 
objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially 
dangerous." Id. at 1051. The Court noted that, in Long, the 
police could have arrested defendant for speeding or for driving 
while intoxicated, but that they did not do so. The Court did 
not answer the question whether, where probable cause to arrest 
exists, "but the officers do not actually effect the arrest," 
they may nevertheless conduct a search as broad as that permitted 
incident to an arrest. Id. at 1035 n.l. In this case, petr 
points out that the officers had probable cause to arrest resp 
for traffic violations at the time of the VIN inspection. In my 
view, the Court need not reach the question reserved in Long in 
order to uphold the VIN inspection. The VIN inspection is much 
more 1 imi ted than that permit ted incident to a lawful arrest. 
See New York v. Belton, 453 u.s. 454 (1981) (where police 
arrested driver of car based on probable cause to believe that 
driver possessed marijuana, police were entitled to search entire 
passenger compartment) • I see no reason to give the police far 
broader authority to search than that needed to permit the 
intrusion that occur red in this case. 
argument in N.Y. Ct. App. 
Petr did not raise this 
19. 
(4) While I believe that my balancing of the interests 
involved in this case is appropriate, I must acknowledge that 
resp's arguments have force. Resp argues that, before police may 
inspect the VIN, they must have an objectively reasonable basis 
to believe that the car is stolen. By opening the car door, the 
officer did expose to view otherwise hidden areas in which resp 
had an expectation of privacy. The fact that resp had no 
expectation of privacy in the VIN itself is irrelevant for he had 
such an expectation in the car. Though the Court has discarded 
the warrant requirement with respect to automobile searches, the 
Court has always held that intrusion into the interior of a car 
must be justified on the
1 
basis of probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion. Resp claims that Pennsylvania v. Mimms is 
distinguishable. In Mimms, the officer's order to the driver to 
' get out of the car meant only that the driver would be detained 
outside the car rather than inside the car. Mimms did not 
involve any search as did this case. Resp also contends that 
police could use less intrusive means to inspect the VIN, such as 
securing the driver's consent. Indeed, as N.Y. Ct. App. noted, 
New York law permits an officer to demand exhibition of the VIN. 
If the officer had done so here, resp would have complied, and no 
intrusion would have occurred. Moreover, through a check of the 
car's license plates, the police will often be able to determine 
that a car is stolen. Resp also believes that this case should 
be governed by the reasoning of Michigan v. Long in which the 
Court held that the police may search a vehicle for weapons only 
20. 
if they have reasonable suspicion that the driver is potentially 
dangerous. 
1 think that resp's arguments are not unreasonable and 
that you could dec ide to strike the balance in favor of the 
driver's interest in being free of governmental intrusion. But 
resp's arguments fail to take account of the fact that police are 
authorized, on a valid stop for traffic violations, to inspect 
other documents and that a VIN inspection would not allow police 
to rummage through the entire passenger compartment. Moreover, 
resp gives very little weight to the public interest in 
permitting police to determine if a vehicle is in compliance with 
the VIN regulatory scheme. 
(5) Finally, one question that might be answered at ___ __..... 
oral argument is what police may do if they order a driver to 
exhibit his license and registration, and he refuses. 1 assume 
that the driver may not withhold his consent. Then, can the 
police search the driver or the car for those documents? Or must 
they arrest the driver? Similarly, if the police are entitled to 
demand exhibition~_ of the VIN, may the driver withhold consent? 
If not, are the pol ice entitled to look for the V IN, or must 
they arrest the driver? It seems to me that, in many cases, it 
would be less intrusive for the officer simply to look for the 
VIN on the spot rather than arrest the driver. 
Conclusion 
VIN inspection does implicate Fourth Amendment concerns 
for it requires police intrusion into a vehicle, an area in which 
citizens have an expectation of privacy. Accordingly, police are 
~ , ' 
not entitled arbitrarily to select vehicles for VIN inspections. 
But, where police lawfully have detained a vehicle for a traffic 
~~-----------------------violation or on reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is involved ,_ ____.. 
in criminal activity, I believe that they should be entitled to 
inspect the V IN. I reach this result upon balancing the strong 
----~ 
law enforcement interest in permitting the police to enforce the 
VIN regulatory scheme against the limited intrusion on individual 
interests caused by the VIN inspection • 
• J . .t 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1181 
NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. BENIGNO CLASS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF NEW YORK 
[December - , 1985] 
~ c:Jjl . 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 1./L ~ 
In this case, we must decide whether, in order to observe a _ ~ 
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) generally visible from 
outside an automobile, a police officer may reach into the pas-~ ~ 
senger compartment of a vehicle to move papers obscuring ~ 
the VIN after its driver has been stopped for a traffic viola-
tion and has exited the car. We hold that, in these circum-~ 6 
stances, the police officer's action does not violate the Fourth /1 ~ _,~ ./ T' 
Amendment. "~~ ~ 
I 
On the afternoon of May 11, 1981, New York City police 
officers Lawrence Meyer and William MeN amee observed re-
spondent Benigno Class driving above the speed limit in a car 
with a cracked windshield. Both driving with a cracked 
windshield and speeding are traffic violations under New 
York law. See N. Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law §§375(22), 
1180(d) (McKinney 1970). Respondent followed the officers' 
ensuing directive to pull over. Respondent then emerged 
from his car and approached Officer Meyer. Officer 
McNamee went directly to respondent's vehicle. Respond-
ent provided Officer Meyer with a registration certificate and 
proof of insurance, but stated that he had no driver's license. 
Meanwhile, Officer MeN amee opened the door of respond-
ent's car to look for the Vehicle Inspection Number (VIN), 
which is located on the left door jamb in automobiles manu-
factured before 1969. When the officer did not find the VIN 
~~ 
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on the door jamb, he reached into the interior of respondent's 
car to move some papers obscuring the area of the dashboard 
where the VIN is located in all post-1969 models. In doing 
so, Officer McNamee saw the handle of a gun protruding 
about one inch from underneath the driver's seat. The offi-
cer seized the gun, and respondent was promptly arrested. 
Respondent was also issued summonses for his traffic 
violations. 
It is undisputed that the police officers had no reason to 
suspect that respondent's car was stolen, that it contained 
contraband, or that respondent had committed an offense 
other than the traffic violations. Nor is it disputed that re-
spondent committed the traffic violations with which he was 
charged, and that, as of the day of the arrest, he had not been 
issued a valid driver's license. 
After the state trial court denied a motion to suppress the 
gun as evidence, respondent was convicted of criminal pos-
session of a weapon in the third degree. See N. Y. Penal 
Law § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1980). The Supreme Court for 
Bronx County upheld the conviction without opinion. The 
New York Court of Appeals reversed. It reasoned that the 
police officer's "intrusion . . . was undertaken to obtain 
information and it exposed . . . hidden areas" of the car, and 
"therefore constituted a search." . People v. Class, 63 
.N. Y.2d 491, 495, 472 N. E. 2d 1009, 1011 (1984). Although 
it recognized that a search for a VIN generally involves a 
I 
minimal intrusion because of its limite<L.Eot~ti~jions, 
and~ there is a compelling law-en£ 'nter-
est in positively identifying ven1c es involved in accidents or 
auto thefts, the court thought it decisive that the facts of this 
case "reveal no reason for the officer to suspect other crimi-
nal activity [besides the traffic infraction] or to act to protect 
his own safety." !d., at 495-496. The state statutory provi-
sion that authorizes officers to demand that drivers reveal 
their VIN "provided no justification for the officer's entry of 
[respondent's] car." ld., at 497. If the officer had taken 
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advantage of that statute and asked to see the VIN, respond-
ent could have moved the papers away himself and no intru-
sion would have occurred. In the absence of any justifica-
tion for the search besides the traffic infraction, the New 
York Court of Appeals ruled that the gun must be excluded 
from evidence. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984), and now 
reverse. 
II 
Respondent asserts that this Court is without jurisdiction 
to hear this case because the decision of the New York Court 
of Appeals rests on an adequate and independent state 
ground. We disagree. 
The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals mentions 
the New York Constitution but once, and then only in direct 
conjunction with the United States Constitution. 63 
N. Y.2d, at 493, 472 N. E. 2d, at 1010. Cf. Michigan v. 
Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1043 (1983). The opinion below makes 
use of both federal and New York cases in its analysis, gener-
ally citing both for the same proposition. See, e. g., 63 
N. Y.2d, at 494, 495, 472 N. E. 2d, at 1011. The opinion 
lacks the requisite "plain statement" that it rests on state 
grounds. Michigan v. Long, supra, at 1042, 1044. Accord-
ingly, our holding in Michigan v. Long is directly applicable 
here: 
"[W]hen . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest 
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the 
federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of 
any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of 
the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable ex-
planation that the state court decided the case the way it 
did because it believed that federal law required it to do 
so." ld., at 1040-1041. 
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Respondent's claim that the opinion below rested on inde-
pendent and adequate state statutory grounds is also without 
merit. The New York Court of Appeals did not hold that 
§ 401 of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law prohibited the 
search at issue here, but, in rejecting an assertion of the peti-
tioner, merely held that § 401 "provided no justification" for 
a search. 63 N. Y.2d, at 497, 472 N. E. 2d, at 1013 (empha-
sis added). In determining that the police officer's action 
was prohibited, the court below looked to the Federal Con-
stitution, not the State's statute. Moreover, New York ad-
heres to the general rule that, when statutory construction 
can resolve a case, courts should not decide constitutional 
issues. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 
U. S. 288, 346-347 (Brandeis, J., concurring); In re Peters v. 
New York City Housing Authority, 307 N. Y. 519, 527, 121 
N. E. 2d 529, 531 (1954). Since the New York Court of Ap-
peals discussed both statutory and constitutional grounds, we 
may infer that the court believed the statutory issue insuffi-
cient to resolve the case. The discussion of the statute 
therefore could not have constituted an independent and ade-
quate state ground. 
III 
A 
The officer here, after observing respondent commit two 
traffic violations and exit the car, attempted to determine the I 
VIN of respondent's automobile. In reaching to remove pa-
pers obscuring the VIN, the officer intruded into the passen-
ger compartment of the vehicle. 
The VIN consists of more than a dozen digits, unique to 
each vehicle and required on all cars and trucks. See 49 
CFR § 571.115 (1984). The VIN is roughly analogous to a 
serial number, but it can be deciphered to reveal not only the 
place of the automobile in the manufacturer's production run, 
but the make, model, engine type, and place of manufacture 
of the vehicle. See id., § 565.4. 
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The VIN is a significant thread in the web of regulation of 
the automobile. See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 2189 (1978). 
The ease with which the VIN allows identification of a par-
ticular vehicle assists the various levels of government in 
many ways. For the federal government, the VIN improves 
the efficacy of recall campaigns, and assists researchers in 
determining the risks of driving various makes and models of 
automobiles. In combination with state insurance laws, the 
VIN reduces the number of those injured in accidents who go 
uncompensated for lack of insurance. In conjunction with 
the state's registration requirements and safety inspections, 
the VIN helps to ensure that automobile operators are driv-
ing safe vehicles. By making auto theft more difficult, the 
VIN safeguards not only property but life and limb. See 33 
Fed. Reg. 10,207 (1968) (noting that stolen vehicles are 
disproportionately likely to be involved in automobile 
accidents). 
To facilitate the VIN's usefulness for these laudable gov-
ernmental purposes,' federal law requi '' that the VIN be 
placed in the plain view o someon outst e e a omo 1 e: 
"The VIN for passenger cars [man actured after 1969] 
shall be located inside the passenger compartment. It 
shall be readable, without moving any part of the vehi-
cle, through the vehicle glazing under daylight lighting 
conditions by an observer having 20/20 vision (Snellen) 
whose eye point is located outside the vehicle adjacent to 
the left windshield pillar. ~ter in the VIN 
subject to this paragraph shall have a minimum height 
of 4 mm." 49 CFR § 571.115 (S 4.6) (1984) (emphasis 
added). 
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 658 (1979), we rec-
ognized the "vital interest" in highway safety and the various 
programs that contribute to that interest. In light of the im-
portant interests served by the VIN, the federal and state 
governments are amply justified in making it a part of the 
web of pervasive regulation that surrounds the automobile, 
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and in requiring its placement in an area ordinarily in plain 
view from outside the passenger compartment. 
B 
A citizen does not surrender all the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile. See Dela-
ware v. Prouse, supra, at 663; Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266, 269 (1973). Nonetheless, the state's 
intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or 
elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation 
unless the area is one in which there is a "constitutionally 
protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, -- (1984); 
Maryland v. Macon,-- U.S.--, at-- (1985). 
The Court has recognized that the physical characteristics 
of an automobile and its use result in a lessened expectation 
of privacy therein: 
"One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehi-
cle because its function is transportation and it seldom 
serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal 
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public 
scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its 
occupants and its contents are in plain view." Cardwell 
v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
Moreover, automobiles are justifiably the subject of perva-
si~ :r_eg:uJatioJl-12y JhJLstate. Every operat~­
hiclelilusteXpecrthat1He state, in enforcing its regulations, 
will intrude to some extent upon that operator's privacy: 
"Automobiles, unlike homes, are subject to pervasive 
and continuing governmental regulation and controls, in-
cluding periodic inspection and licensing requirements. 
As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine ve-
hicles when license plates or inspection stickers have ex-
pired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or ex-
cessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety 
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equipment are not in proper working order." South Da-
kota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 368 (1976). 
See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 441-442 (1973); 
California v. Carney, supra, at--. 
The factors that generally diminish the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in automobiles are applicable a fortiori to the 
VIN. As we have discussed above, the VIN plays an impor-
tant part in the pervasive regulation by the government of 
the automobile. A motorist must surely expect that such 
regulation will on occasion require the State to determine the 
VIN of his or her vehicle, and the individual's reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby diminished. 
This is especially true in the case of a driver who has commit-
ted a traffic violation. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 
659 ("The foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle 
safety regulations . . . is acting upon observed violations. 
Vehicle stops for traffic violations occur countless times each 
day; and on these occasions, license and registration papers 
are subject to inspection and drivers without them will be as-
certained.") (emphasis added). In addition, it is unreason-
able to have an expectation of privacy in an object required 
by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from 
the exterior of the automobile. The YIN's mandated visibil-
ity makes it more similar to the exterior of the car than to the 
trunk or glove compartment. The exterior of a car, of 
course, is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it 
does not constitute a "search." See Cardwell v. Lewis, 
supra, at 588-589. In sum, because of the important role 
played by the VIN in the pervasive governmental regulation 
of the automobile and the efforts by the federal government 
to ensure that the VIN is placed in plain view, we hold that 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN. 
We think it makes no difference that the papers in respond-; 
ent's car obscured the VIN from th~fficer. 
We a e ecen y emphasized t a ef o s to restrict access 
to an area do not enerate a reaso~ri-
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vacy where none would otherwise exist. / See Oliver v. 
United StateS; supra, at-- (placement of "No Trespassing" 
signs on secluded property does not create "legitimate pri-
vacy interest" in marijuana fields). Here, where the object 
at issue is an identification number behind the transparent 
windshield of an automobile driven upon the public roads, we 
believe that the placement of the obscuring papers was insuf-
ficient to create a privacy interest in the VIN. The mere 
viewing of the formerly obscured VIN was not, therefore, a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
c 
The evidence that respondent sought to have suppressed 
was not the VIN, however, b~, the handle of which 
the officer saw from the interior of the car while reaching for 
the papers that covered the VIN. While the interior of an 
automobile is not subject to the same expectations of privacy 
that exist with respect to one's home, a car's interior as a 
whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protec-
tion from unreasonable intrusions by the police. We agree 
with the New York Court of Appeals that the intrusion into 
that space constituted a "search." 63 N. ~72 
N. E. ~ware v. Prouse, supra, at 653 
("stoppin an automobile and d a "ts c nsti-
tute a seizure' . . . even though the purpose of the stop is 
lim1 e an the resulting detention quite brief"). We must 
decide, therefore, whether this search was constitutionally 
permissible. 
If respondent had remained in the car, the police would 
have been justified in asking him to move the papers obscur-
ing the VIN. New York law authorizes a demand by officers 
to see the VIN, see 63 N. Y.2d, at 496-497, 472 N. E. 2d, at 
1012-1013, and even if the state law were not explicit on this 
point we have no difficulty in concluding that a demand to in-
spect the VIN, like a demand to see license and registration 
papers, is within the scope of police authority pursuant to a 
' . ... 
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traffic violation stop. See Prouse, supra, at 659. If re-
spondent had stayed in his vehicle and acceded to such a 
request from the officer, the officer would not have needed 
to intrude into the passenger compartment. Respondent 
chose, however, to exit the vehicle without removing the pa-
pers that covered the VIN; the officer chose to conduct his 
search without asking respondent to return to the car. We 
must therefore decide whether the fficer acted within the 
boun s of t e Fourth Amendment in condUCtfn ~ch. ~ 
We hol t at he 1d. 
~er of a vehicle in the car during a routine 
traffic stop is probably the typical police practice. See D. 
Schultz and D. Hunt, Traffic Investigation and Enforcement 
17 (1983). Nonetheless, out of a concern for the safety of the 
police, the Court has held that officers may, consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment, exercise their discretion to require a 
driver who commits a traffic violation to exit the vehicle. 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam). 
While we impute to respondent no propensity for violence, 
and while we · are conscious of the fact that respondent here 
voluntarily left the vehicle, the facts of this case may be used 
to illustrate one of the principal justifications for the discre-
tion given police officers by Pennsylvania v. Mimms: while 
in the driver's seat, respondent had a loaded pistol at hand. 
Mimms allows an officer to guard against that possibility by 
requiring the driver to exit the car briefly. Clearly, Mimms 
also allowed the officers here to detain respondent briefly 
outside the car that he voluntarily exited while they com-
pleted their investigation. 
The question remains, however, as to whether the officers ( 
could not only effect the seizure of respondent necessary to 
detain him briefly outside the vehicle, but also effect a search 
for the VIN that may have been necessary only because of 
that detention. The pistol beneath the seat did not, of 
course, disappear when respondent closed the car door be-
hind him. To have returned respondent immediately to the 
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automobile would have placed the officers in the same situa-
tion that the holding in Mimms allows officers to avoid-per-
mitting an individual being detained to have possible access 
to a dangerous weapon and the benefit of the partial conceal-
ment provided by the car's exterior. See Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, supra, at 110. In light of the danger to the officers' 
safety that would have been presented by returning respond-
ent immediately to his car, we think the search to obtain the 
VIN was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. I 
The Fourth Amendment by its terms prohibits "unreason-
able" searches and seizures. We have noted that 
"there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] 
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] en-
tails.' Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 
534-535, 536-537 (1967). And in justifying the particu-
lar intrusion the police officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
.rational inferences from those facts, justifiably warrant 
that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968) 
(footnote omitted) (brackets as in Terry). 
This test generally means that searches must be conducted 
pursuant to a warrant backed by probable cause. See 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 105-109 (1965); 
United States v. Karo, -- U.S. --, at -- (1984). 
When a search or seizure has as its immediate object a search I 
for a weapon, however, we have struck the balance to allow 
the weighty interest in the safety of police officers to justify 
warrantless searches based only on a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. See TerFi/v. ·-vHro, 392lJ.8.i(1968); 
Adams v. tlliams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972). Such searches 
are permissible despite their substantial intrusiveness. See 
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 24-25 (search was "a severe, though 
brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and . . . 
must surely [have] b[een] an annoying, frightening, and per-
haps humiliating experience"). 
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When the officer's safety is less directly served by the de-
tention, something more than objectively justifiable suspicion 
is necessary to justify the intrusion if the balance is to tip in 
favor of the legality of the governmental intrusion. In 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, at 107, the officers had per-
sonally observed the seized individual in the commission of a 
traffic offense before requesting that he exit his vehicle. In 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 693 (1981), the officers 
had obtained a warrant to search the house that the person 
seized was leaving when they came upon him. While the 
facts in Pennsylvania v. Mimms and Michigan v. Summers ) 
differ in some respects from the facts of this case, the similar-
ities are strong enough that the balancing of governmental 
interests against governmental intrusion undertaken in those 
cases is also appropriate here. All three of the factors in-
volved in Mimms and Summers ar'e present iilihfs case: the 
U/saf~ of the officers was served by);~ governmental intru-
siQnf2-the intrusion was minimal; an<P'the search stemmed 
from some probable cause focusing suspicion on the individual 
affected by the sea~. Indeed, here the officer's probable 
cause stemmed from directly observing respondent commit a 
violation of the law. 
When we undertake the necessary balancing of "the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against the importance of the govern-
mental interests alleged to justify the intrusion," United 
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 703 (1983), the conclusion that 
the search here was permissible follows. As we recognized 
in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 658, the governmental in-
terest in highway safety served by obtaining the VIN is of 
the first order, and the particular method of obtaining the 
VIN here was justified by a concern for the officer's safety. 
The "critical" issue of the intrusiveness of the government's 
action, United States v. Place, supra, at 722 (BLACKMUN, J., 
concurring in the judgment), also here weighs in favor of al-
lowing the search. The search was focused in its objective 
f 
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and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objective. 
The search was far less intrusive than a formal arrest, which 
would have been permissible for a traffic offense under N€w 
York law, seeN. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 155 (McKin-
ney 1970 & 1984-1985 Pocket Part); id., Criminal Procedure 
Law, § 140.10(1) (1981), and little more intrusive than a de-
mand that the respondent-under the eyes of the officers-
move the papers himself. The VIN, which was the clear ini-
tial objective of the officer, is by law present in one of two 
locations-either inside the door jamb, or atop the dashboard 
and thus ordinarily in plain view of someone outside the auto-
mobile. Neither of those locations is subject to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The officer here checked both those 
locations, and only those two locations. The officer did not 
root about the interior of the respondent's automobile before 
proceeding to examine the VIN. He did not reach into any 
compartments or open any containers. He did not even in-
trude into the interior at all until after he had checked the 
door jamb for the VIN. When he did intrude, the officer 
simply reached directly for the unprotected space where the 
VIN was located to move the offending papers. We hold 
that this search was sufficiently unintrusive to be constitu-
tionally permissible in light of the lack of a reasonable exp€c-
tation of privacy in the VIN and the fact that the officers ob-
served respondent commit two traffic violations. Any other 
conclusion would expose police officers to potentially grave 
risks without significantly reducing the intrusiveness of the 
ultimate conduct-viewing the VIN-which, as we have said, 
the officers were entitled to do as part of an undoubtedly jus-
tified traffic stop. 
We note that our holding today does not authorize police 
officers to enter a vehicle to obtain a dashboard-mounted 
VIN when the VIN is visible from outside the automobile. 
If the VIN is in the plain view of someone outside the vehicle, 
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there is no justification for governmental intrusion into the 
passenger compartment to see it.* 
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
*Petitioner invites us to hold that respondent's status as an unlicensed 
driver deprived him of any reasonable expectations of privacy in the vehi-
cle, because the officers would have been within their discretion to have 
prohibited respondent from driving the car away, to have impounded the 
car, and to have later conducted an inventory search thereof. Cf. South 
Dakota v. Opperman, supra (police may conduct inventory search of car 
impounded for multiple parking violations); Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431 
(1984) (discussing the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary 
rule). Petitioner also argues that there can be no Fourth Amendment vi-
olation here because the police could have arrested respondent, see N. Y. 
Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 155 (McKinney 1970 & 1984-1985 Pocket Part); 
id., Criminal Procedure Law, § 140.10(1) (1981), and could then have 
searched the passenger compartment at the time of arrest, cf. New York v. 
Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), or arrested respondent and searched the car 
after impounding it pursuant to the arrest, see Cady v. Dombrowski, 
supra. We do not, however, reach those questions here. 
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Re: No. 84-1181, New York v. Class 
Dear Sandra: 
December 20, 1985 
I am fairly certain I shall be with you in this 
case, but, for now, I shall wait to see what the dissent 
has to say. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
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Dear Sandra, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
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m~ (that we~everse the judgment of the New York 
Court of Appeals on the ground that, in light of the unique and 
important governmental interests served by inspection of the 
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), the limited intrusion 
~d by the officer in this case was not an unreasonable 
search of respondent's automobile. 
~ As the Court explains, the VIN essentially is a serial 
number that, by identifying certain features of the vehicle to 
which it is affixed, provides an effective and reliable means for 
2-
positive identification of the vehicle. Accordingly, the VIN 
occupies a central position in the elaborate federal and state 
H..,~t 
regulation of automobiles, ~1 frequently depend on such 
positive identification. 
direct manufacturers to place the VIN in a location where it 
in the plain view of an observer standing outside the vehicle. 
49 C.F.R. §571.115 S4.6 (1984). 
When an officer lawfully has stopped a motor vehicle for 
violation of traffic or other law, the officer is entitled to 
I 
inspect license and registration documents. See Deleware v. 
Prouse, 440 u.s. 650 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 u.s. 106 
(1977) (per curiam). Unquestionably, the officer also may look 
through the windshield, observe the VIN, and record it without 
implicating any Fourth Amendment concerns. Resp does not 
contend, nor could it reasonably be contended, that such action 
violates the federal Constitution. The question raised on the 
facts of this case, therefore, is whether the Fourth Amendment 
• .. , 
I l 
was offended by the "incremental intrusion" resulting from the 
officer's efforts to observe the VIN once respondent's vehicle 
lawfully was stopped. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, at 109. 
The answer to this question may be simply stated. Whether 
the intrusion into respondent's vehicle offended the Fourth 
Amendment "requires a weighing of the governmental and societal 
interests advanced to justify" the intrusion "against the 
constitutionally protected interest of the individual citizen in 
the privacy of his effects." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 u.s. 
364, 378 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). As the Court observes, 
~~-~~ 
the State has a legitimate and we4~hey interest in permitting its 
.... 
police officers to inspect the VIN on a car stopped for a traffic 
violation. Ante at On the other side of the balance, ~ 
~~~~ 
ne~ iee ~ intrusion on resp2ndeRt's privacy ~ 
.... 
~.1-~~~~-r-~ 
when t~ officer opened the car door and then moved ~ papers 
"' 
~
obscur~ the VIN from plain view. This additional intrusion, 
.11 ..... 
undertaken to accomplish a law enforcement purpose that the 
officer was then entitled to pursue, was limited to that area of 
the vehicle where the VIN is found. While it may be better 
practice for officers to ask the driver to move papers or objects 
obscuring the VIN, the minor additional intrusion caused by the 
officer's undertaking that step himself does not outweigh the 
important public interests served by VIN inspection. 
Accordingly, where a police officer lawfully stops a motor 
vehicle, the officer is entitled to inspect the VIN. If the 
driver of the car is unavailable or declines to cooperate, the 
Fourth Amendment presents no barrier to the officer's taking 
reasonable steps, such as those reflected in this case, to 
inspect the VIN. 
December 20, 1985 
CLASS GINA-POW 
DRAFT 
84-1181 New York v. Class 
Justice Powell concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion, but write to suggest that 
we could reverse the judgment of the New York Court of 
Appeals because of the unique purpose and importance of 
the federally required Vehicle Identification Number 
(V IN) . 
As the Court notes, the VIN is analogous to a serial 
number that identifies the make, model, engine type, and 
place of manufacture of the vehicle. See 49 CRF Section 
565.4. '!'he importance of the VIN in the federal and state 
elaborate system of regulating motor vehicles is well 
summarized in the Court's opinion. See ante particularly 
at pp _. ___ . Federal Regulations now require that the VIN 
be placed somewhere outside the vehicle in plain view. 
Under current practice, the manufacturer locates the VIN 
on the inside of the windshield of the vehicle, usually on 
2. 
the top of the "dashboard", where it is in plain view of 
one standing beside the vehicle. 
Whenever a motor vehicle is stopped lawfully because 
of a traffic or other violation law, the police officer 
who makes the stop or another officer present, may 
observe a visible VIN and make a record of it without this 
constituting either a search or a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment. The purpose of the fede:r;al regulations 
requiring the location of the VIN in plain view from the 
outside contemplates this. It is not contended nor 
could it reasonably be contended - that the requirement 
vio l ates any constitutional right. 
,-, / /1...e- p.pj~ t.t).. r The problem presented I'\ ~y this case 
the VIN, located on the dashboard 
fA/'4-A-
.i,..e.-to~-+'hl'll~--.jfF-fe:'I"'C-~"""' ~that 
just behind the 
,~~~Ra~~t windshield, was obscured by papers either 
~ ~ 
deliberately or inadvertantly placed there. bJ1t officer 
standing on the outside was prevented by this obstruction 
\ 
from viewing the V IN. Moreover, respondent - the driver 
of the vehicle - had left it when he was directed to 
"pull over" for violating the speed limit, and driving 
with a cracked windshield contrary to New York State law. 
The sequence of events that transpired is well-stated in 
the Court's opinion. Suffice it to say here that 
3. 
respondent had left his vehicle to talk to one of the 
officer when the other officer sought to observe the VIN 
number of the stopped automobile. 
~enaib~ 
This officer did what 
When he could not 
see the VIN from the outside beoause it; was eescaz ee G¥-.. 
> 
~PaP"et :"rr and wOh the driver having left the vehicle, the 
officer simply looked ins ide sufficiently to remove the 
~r~~~~~ 
papers t · · rtt-empNted b~. It was 
only then that the officer happened to observe a portion 
of a handgun protruding from beneath the front seat. The 
Court of Appeals of New York held that this intrusion was 
an unlawful search and seizure. This Court today agrees 
there were both ~ search and seizure, and justified these 
this 
so~ oe.laborate ~cess. 
~i~ the. outside, is obscured 
deliberately or by the negligence of the person driving 
-~~~-
the vehicle, I would hold that ~ the officer has a legal 
right to enter the vehicle sufficiently to remove any 
obstruction. There is no finding in this case that the 
~~ ,t.{) 
officer's entry - ~~ leaning through an open door 
~ 
- was unnecessary to achieve the lawful purpose. If the 
4. 
driver had remained in his seat, as the Court observes, 
the proper procedure would have been to request that the 
papers obstructing the VIN be removed. In the absence of 
compliance with such a request, an arrest would have been 
lawful. 
In summary, in view of the important public purposes 
served by the VIN identification system, I would hold that 
where a lawful stop of a motor vehicle is made by a police 
- a-...1. ~~ ~ d_~ 
officer, he has a legal right to see the V IN, and to 
" remove any obstruction that presents this where the driver 
of the vehicle is either not available or declines to 
I lt-6-
cooperate. T~.s.i.mw, .. :¥ j s_no reasonttb1e '( expectation of 
privacy with respect to this motor vehicle ident~c~t;~~ 
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84-1181 New York v. Class 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion but write~ 
"\ ~ 
that because of the unique and important governmental 
interests served by inspection of the Vehicle 
Identification Number (VIN), an officer making a lawful 
~i{~tt-d.......t&:, 
stop of a vehicle ~~~R~~ o~~f~~~· e~? has a legal rightAto inspect 
the VIN. Where it is not visible from outside the vehicle 
or voluntarily disclosed by the driver, the officer may 
enter - i.e. look into - the inside of the vehicle to the 
extent necessary to read the VIN. 
As the Court explains, the VIN essentially is a 
serial number that, by identifying certain features of the 
vehicle to which it is affixed, provides an effective and 
2. 
reliable means for positive identification of the 
vehicle. AQeeEQj~~, ~e VIN occupies a central position 
in the elaborate federal and state regulation of 
automobiles, that frequently depend on such positive 
identification. Federal regulations now direct 
manufacturers to place the VIN in a location where it is 
in the plain view of an observer standing outside the 
vehicle. 49 C.F.R. §571.115 S4.6 (1984). 
The Court has Eo~ r~ answeredJlt~~estion ~ 
~ t...c.. ~ t!:A.-1 .c:.. .. ~ 
~ applying conventional Fourth Amendment analysis. I 
believe, however, that the right of an officer to observe 
the VIN need not be subjected to the same level of 
scrutiny that courts properly apply when there has been a 
# 
police intrusion of a vehicl~ 
3. 
~When an officer lawfully has stopped a motor 
~~trY-~ 
vehicle for violation of traffic or other law, the officer 
1\ 
is entitled to inspect license and registration documents. 
See Deleware v. Prouse, 440 u.s. 650 (1979); Pennsylvania 
v. Mimms, 434 u.s. 106 (1977) (per curiam). 
Unquestionably, the officer also may look through the 
windshield, observe the VIN, and record it without 
implicating any Fourth Amendment concerns. Respondent 
does not contend, nor could it reasonably be contended, 
that such action violates the federal Constitution. The 
question raised on the facts of this case, therefore, is 
whether the Fourth Amendment was offended by the 
~incremental intru~ resulting from the officer's 
efforts to observe the VIN once respondent's vehicle 
4. 
lawfully was stopped. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, 
at 109. 
The problem presented the officer in this case was 
that the V!N, located on the dashboard just behind the 
windshield, was obscured by papers either deliberately or 
inadvertently placed there. The officer standing on the 
outside was prevented by this obstruction from viewing the 
VlN~<eover,~spon ent- the driver of the 
left it ~ he was directed to ~ 
11 PU11 and driving 
ith a cracked windshield contrary to New York S 
~ The sequence of events that transpired is well-stated in 
the Court's opinion. Suffice it to say here that 
respondent had left his vehicle to talk to one of the 
~ > 
~ when the other officer sought to observe the V!N 
<;; td- _/1 
number of the stopped automobile. This officer did what 
his duty required. When he could not see the VlN from the 
the driver having left the vehicle, the 
eA. 
the officer happen~ t~ observe a portion of a handgun 
1\. 
protruding from beneath the front seat. The Court of 
Appeals of New York held that this intrusion was an 
unlawful search and seizure. This Court today agrees 
there were both a search and seizure, and justified these 
by reasoning familiar in automobile cases. 
ln my view, the Fourth Amendment question is a 
4<:, k..,._ 1- o1 UJ.._ 
more limited one. It is simply whether the officer's 
1\ 
'* efforts to see the VIN were unreasonable. Where the ~~IN 
is obscured deliberately or by the negligence of the 
6. 
person driving the vehicle, I would hold that - absent 
consent - the officer has a legal right to enter the 
vehicle sufficiently to remove any obstruction. There is 
no finding in this case that the officer's entry- limited 
to a leaning through an open door -
"K.()f~ 
was ~~necessary to 
achieve th~lawful purpose. If the driver had remained in 
his seat, as the Court observes, the proper procedure 
would have been to request that the papers obstructing the 
VIN be removed. In the absence of compliance with such a 
request, an arrest would have been lawful. 
In summary, in view of the important public purposes 
served by the VIN identification system, I would hold that 
where a lawful stop of a motor vehicle is made by a police 
officer, he has a legal right - and often a duty - to see 
the VIN, and to remove any obstruction that presents this 
7. 
where the driver of the vehicle is e i ther not available or 
declines to cooperate. The expectation of privacy with 
respect to this motor vehicle identification is minimal. 1 
1. I do not suggest, of course, that the F 
is inapplicable. An officer could use the 'ght to 
observe the VIN as a pretext for looking insi e the 
vehicle for contraband or weapons, or that th entry - for 
whatever purpose - was ~ more extensive than necessary 
to remove any obstruction and read the numbers of the VIN. 
12/31 
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1181 
NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. BENIGNO CLASS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF NEW YORK 
[January -, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion but write to emphasize that, be-
cause of the unique and important governmental interests 
served by inspection of the Vehicle Identification Number 
(VIN), an officer making a lawful stop of a vehicle has the 
right and duty to inspect the VIN. Where the VIN is not 
visible from outside the vehicle or voluntarily disclosed by 
the driver, the officer may enter the vehicle to the extent 
necessary to read the VIN. 
As the Court explains, the VIN essentially is a serial num-
ber that, by identifying certain features of the vehicle to 
which it is affixed, provides an effective and reliable means 
for positive identification of the vehicle. The VIN occupies 
a central position in the elaborate federal and state regulation 
of automobiles, that frequently depend on such positive iden-
tification. Federal regulations now direct manufacturers to 
place the VIN in a location where it is in the plain view of an 
observer standing outside the vehicle. 49 CFR § 571.115 
S4.6 (1984). 
The Court has answered correctly the question presented 
in this case by applying conventional Fourth Amendment 
analysis. I believe, however, that an officer's efforts to ob-
serve the VIN need not be subjected to the same scrutiny 
that courts properly apply when police have intruded into a 
vehicle to arrest or to search for evidence of crime. When an 
officer lawfully has stopped a motor vehicle for a traffic in-
84-1181-CONCUR 
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fraction, the officer is entitled to inspect license and registra-
tion documents. See Deleware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 650 
(1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per 
curiam). Unquestionably, the officer also may look through 
the windshield, observe the VIN, and record it without impli-
cating any Fourth Amendment concerns. Respondent 
does not contend, nor could it reasonably be contended, that 
such action violates the federal Constitution. The question 
raised on the facts of this case, therefore, is whether the 
Fourth Amendment was offended by the incremental intru-
sion resulting from the officer's efforts to observe this VIN 
once respondent's vehicle lawfully was stopped. Cf. Penn-
sylvania v. Mimms, supra, at 109. 
The problem for the officer was that the VIN, located on 
the dashboard just behind the windshield, was obscured by 
papers. The sequence of events that transpired is well-
stated in the Court's opinion. Suffice it to say here that, 
when respondent left his vehicle to talk to one of the officers, 
the other officer sought to determine the VIN of the automo-
bile. This officer did what his duty required. When he 
could not see the VIN from outside the car, and the driver 
having exited the vehicle, the officer intruded into the car to 
the extent necessary to remove the papers that obstructed 
his view. It was only then that he observed a handgun pro-
truding from beneath the front seat. The Court of Appeals 
of New York held that this intrusion was an unlawful search 
and seizure. While agreeing that a search and seizure oc-
curred, this Court today sustains the validity of both on rea-
soning familiar in cases applying Fourth Amendment princi-
ples to automobiles. 
In my view, the Fourth Amendment question may be 
stated simply as whether the extent of the officer's efforts to 
inspect the VIN wefe: reasonable. Where the VIN is ob- ~d.~\ 
scured deliberately or by the negligence of the driver, I 
84-1181-CONCUR 
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would hold that, absent consent, the officer may enter the 
vehicle sufficiently to remove the obstruction. There is no 
finding in this case that the officer's entry-opening the car 
door and reaching his hand to the dashboard-was not rea-
sonably necessary to achieve his lawful purpose. If the 
driver had remained in his seat, as the Court observes, the 
officer properly should have requested the driver to remove 
the papers obstructing the VIN. In the absence of compli-
ance with such a request, an arrest would have been lawful. 
In view of the important public purposes served by the 
VIN system and the minimal expectation of privacy in the le-
gally required VIN, I would hold that where a police officer 
lawfully stops a motor vehicle, he may inspect the VIN, and 
remove any obstruction preventing VIN inspection, where 
the driver of the vehicle either is not available or declines to 
cooperate.* 
*I do not suggest, of course, that the Fourth Amendment is inapplica-
ble in this context. An officer may not use VIN inspection as a pretext for 
searching a vehicle for contraband or weapons. Nor may the officer un-
dertake an entry more extensive than reasonably necessary to remove any 
obstruction and read the VIN. 
CHAMeERS OF" 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dear Sandra, 
.Snvrtmt Qlmut of tlrt ~th .Statts 
Jla:sJri:nghm. ~. Ql. 20@~~ 
January 6, 1986 
No. 84-1181 
New York v. Class 
Please join me. I also am circulating a concurring 
opinion. 
Sincerely, 
J. F. p /~('_ 
Lewis 
cc: The Conference 
t 
Dear Sandra, 
January 6, 1986 
No. 84-1181 
New York v. Class 
Please join me. I also am circulating a concurring 
opinion. 
Si.ncerely, 
r .. ewis 
cc: ~he Conference 
'· 








From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
UAN 8 1986 Recirculated:. ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITEb STATES 
No. 84-1181 
NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. BENIGNO CLASS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF NEW YORK 
[January - , 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, 
concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion but write to emphasize that, be-
cause of the unique and important governmental interests 
served by inspection of the Vehicle Identification Number 
(VIN), an officer making a lawful stop of a vehicle has the 
right and duty to inspect the VIN. Where the VIN is not 
visible from outside the vehicle or voluntarily disclosed by 
the driver, the officer may enter the vehicle to the extent 
necessary to read the VIN. 
As the Court explains, the VIN essentially is a serial num-
ber that, by identifying certain features of the vehicle to 
which it is affixed, provides an effective and reliable means 
for positive identification of the vehicle. The VIN occupies a 
central position in the elaborate federal and state regulation 
of automobiles, which frequently depends on such positive 
identification. Federal regulations now direct manufactur-
ers to place the VIN in a location where it is in the plain view 
of an observer standing outside the vehicle. 49 CFR 
§ 571.115 S4.6 (1984). 
The Court has answered correctly the question presented 
in this case by applying conventional Fourth Amendment 
analysis. I believe, however, that an officer's efforts to ob-
serve the VIN need not be subjected to the same scrutiny 
that courts properly apply when police have intruded into a 
vehicle to arrest or to search for evidence of crime. When an 
t 
84-1181-CONCUR 
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officer lawfully has stopped a motor vehicle for a traffic in-
fraction, the officer is entitled to inspect license and registra-
tion documents. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 
(1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per 
curiam). Unquestionably, the officer also may look through 
the windshield, observe the VIN, and record it without impli-
cating any Fourth Amendment concerns. Respondent does 
not contend, nor could it reasonably be contended, that such 
action violates the federal Constitution. The question raised 
on the facts of this case, therefore, is whether the Fourth 
Amendment was offended by the incremental intrusion re-
sulting from the officer's efforts to observe this VIN once re-
spondent's vehicle lawfully was stopped. Cf. Pennsylvania 
v. Mimms, supra, at 109. 
The problem for the officer was that the VIN, located on 
the dashboard just behind the windshield, was obscured by 
papers. The sequence of events that transpired is well-
stated in the Court's opinion. Suffice it to say here that, 
when respondent left his vehicle to talk to one of the officers, 
the other officer sought to determine the VIN of the automo-
bile. This officer did what his duty required. Because he 
could not see the VIN from outside the car, and because the 
driver had exited the vehicle, the officer entered the car to 
the extent necessary to move the papers covering the VIN. 
It was only then that he observed a handgun protruding from 
beneath the front seat. The Court of Appeals of New York 
held that this intrusion was an unlawful search. While 
agreeing that a search occurred, this Court today sustains 
the officer's action on reasoning familiar in cases applying 
Fourth Amendment principles to automobiles. 
In my view, the Fourth Amendment question may be 
stated simply as whether the officer's efforts to inspect the 
VIN were reasonable. There is no finding in this case that 
the officer's entry into respondent's vehicle-opening the 
84-1181-CONCUR 
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door and reaching his hand to the dashboard-was not rea-
sonably necessary to achieve his lawful purpose. If respond-
ent had remained in his seat, as the Court observes, the offi-
cer properly should have requested him to remove the papers 
obstructing the VIN. In the absence of compliance with 
such a request, an arrest would have been lawful. Cf. Peo-
ple v. Ellis, 62 N. Y. 2d 393, 477 N. Y. S. 2d 106, 465 N. E. 
2d 826 (1984) (on lawful traffic stop, officers properly ar-
rested driver for failure to produce license or other 
identification). 
In view of the important public purposes served by the 
VIN system and the minimal expectation of privacy in the 
VIN, I would hold that where a police officer lawfully stops a 
motor vehicle, he may inspect the VIN, and remove any ob-
struction preventing such inspection, where the driver of the 
vehicle either is unwilling or unable to cooperate.* 
*I do not suggest, of course, that the Fourth Amendment is inapplica-
ble in this context. An officer may not use VIN inspection as a pretext for 
searching a vehicle for contraband or weapons. Nor may the officer un-
dertake an entry more extensive than reasonably necessary to remove any 
obstruction and read the VIN. 
CHAMISERS 01" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
• 
ilnprtnu Clf&ntri &tf tift ~b iltatta 
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January 29, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1181-New York v. Benigno Class 
Dear Bill: 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: _ _ _______ _ 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1181 
NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. BENIGNO CLASS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF NEW YORK 
[January-, 1986] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, we must decide whether, in order to observe a 
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) generally visible from 
outside an automobile, a police officer may reach into the pas-
senger compartment of a vehicle to move papers obscuring 
the VIN after its driver has been stopped for a traffic viola-
tion and has exited the car. We hold that, in these circum-
stances, the police officer's action does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
I 
On the afternoon of May 11, 1981, New York City police 
officers Lawrence Meyer and William MeN amee observed re-
spondent Benigno Class driving above the speed limit in a car 
with a cracked . windshield. Both driving with a cracked 
windshield and speeding are traffic violations under New 
York law. See N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law §§375(22), 
1180(d) (McKinney 1970). Respondent followed the officers' 
ensuing directive to pull over. Respondent then emerged 
from .his car and approached Officer Meyer. Officer 
McNamee went directly to respondent's vehicle. Respond-
ent provided Officer Meyer with a registration certificate and 
' proof of insurance, butstated that he had no driver's license. 
Meanwhile, Officer McNamee opened the door of respond-
ent's car to look for the Vehicle Inspection Number (VIN), 
which is located on the left door jamb in automobiles manu-
factured before 1969. When the officer did not find the VIN 
• 
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on the door jamb, he reached into the interior of respondent's 
car to move some papers obscuring the area of the dashboard 
where the VIN is located in all post-1969 models. In doing 
so, Officer McNamee saw the handle of a gun protruding 
about one inch from underneath the driver's seat. The offi-
cer seized the gun, and respondent was promptly arrested. 
Respondent was also issued summonses for his traffic 
violations. 
It is undisputed that the police officers had no reason to 
suspect that respondent's car was stolen, that it contained 
contraband, or that respondent had committed an offense 
other than the traffic violations. Nor is it disputed that re-
spondent committed the traffic violations with which he was 
charged, and that, as of the day of the arrest, he had not been 
issued a valid driver's license. 
Mter the state trial court denied a motion to suppress the 
gun as evidence, respondent was convicted of criminal pos-
session of a weapon in the third degree. See N. Y. Penal 
Law § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1980). The Supreme Court for 
Bronx County upheld the conviction without opinion. The 
New York Court of Appeals reversed. It reasoned that the 
police officer's "intrusion . . . was undertaken to obtain 
information and it exposed . . . hidden areas" of the car, and 
"therefore constituted a search." People v. Class, 63 
N. Y.2d 491, 495, 472 N. E. 2d 1009, 1011 (1984). Although 
it recognized that a search for a VIN generally involves a 
minimal intrusion because of its limited potential locations, 
and agreed that there is a compelling law-enforcement inter-
est in positively identifying vehicles involved in accidents or 
auto thefts, the court thought it decisive that the facts of this 
case "reveal no reason for the officer to suspect other· crimi-
nal activity [besides the traffic infraction] or to act to protect 
his own safety." !d., at 495-496. The state statutory provi-
sion that authorizes officers to demand that drivers reveal 
their VIN "provided no justification for the officer's entry of 
[respondent's] car." ld., at 497. If the officer had taken 
84-1181-0PINION 
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advantage of that statute and asked to see the VIN, respond-
ent could have moved the papers away himself and no intru-
sion would have occurred. In the absence of any justifica-
tion for the search besides the traffic infraction, the New 
York Court of Appeals ruled that the gun must be excluded 
from evidence. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1984), and now 
reverse. 
II 
Respondent asserts that this Court is without jurisdiction 
to hear this case because the decision of the New York Court 
of Appeals rests on an adequate and independent state 
ground. We disagree. 
The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals mentions 
the New York Constitution but once, and then only in direct 
conjunction with the United Sfates Constitution. 63 
N. Y.2d, at 493, 472 N. E. 2d, at 1010. Cf. Michigan ·v. 
Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1043 (1983). The opinion below makes 
use of both federal and New York cases in its analysis, gener-
ally citing both for the same proposition. See, e. g., 63 
N. Y.2d, at 494, 495, 472 N. E. 2d, at 1011. The opinion 
lacks the requisite "plain statement" that it rests on state 
grounds. Michigan v. Long, supra, at 1042, 1044. Accord-
ingly, our holding in Michigan v. Long is directly applicable 
here: 
"[W]hen ... a state court decision fairly appears to rest 
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the 
federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of 
any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of 
the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable ex-
planation that the state court decided the case the way it 
did because it believed that federal law required it to do 
so." /d., at 1040-1041. 
See also California v. Carney,-- U.· S. --, -- n. 1 
(1985). 
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Respondent's claim that the opinion below rested on inde-
pendent and adequate state statutory grounds is also without 
merit. The New York Court of Appeals did not hold that 
§401 of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law prohibited the 
search at issue here, but, in rejecting an assertion of peti-
tioner, merely held that § 401 "provided no justification" for 
a search. .63 N. Y.2d, at 497, 472 N. E. 2d, at 1013 (empha-
sis added). In determining that the police officer's action 
was prohibited, the court below looked to the Federal Con-
stitution, not the State's statute. Moreover, New York ad-
heres to the general rule that, when statutory construction 
can resolve a case, courts should not decide constitutional 
issues. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 
U. S. 288, 346-347 (Brandeis, J., concurring); In re Peters v. 
New York City Housing Authority, 307 N. Y. 519, 527, 121 
N. E. 2d 529, ·531 (1954). Since the New York Court of Ap-
peals discussed both statutory and constitutional grounds, we 
may infer that the court believed the statutory issue insuffi-
cient to resolve the case. The discussion of the statute 
therefore could not have constituted an independent and ade-
quate state ground. 
III 
A 
The officer here, after observing respondent commit two 
traffic violations and exit the car, attempted to determine the 
VIN of respondent's automobile. In reaching to remove pa-
pers obscuring the VIN, the officer intruded into the passen-
ger compartment of the vehicle. 
The VIN consists of more than a dozen digits, unique to 
each vehicle and required on all cars and trucks. See 49 
CFR § 571.115 (1984). The VIN is roughly analogous to a 
serial number, but it can be deciphered to reveal not only the 
place of the automobile in the manufacturer's production run, 
but the make, model, engine type, and place of manufacture 
of the vehicle. See id. § 565.4. 
84-1181-0PINION 
NEW YORK v. CLASS 5 
The VIN is a significant thread in the web of regulation of 
the automobile. See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 2189 (1978). 
The ease with which the VIN allows identification of a par-
ticular vehicle assists the various levels of government in 
many ways. For the federal government, the VIN improves 
the efficacy of recall campaigns, and assists researchers in 
determining the risks of driving various makes and models of 
automobiles. In combination with state insurance laws, the 
VIN reduces the number of those injured in accidents who go 
uncompensated for lack of insurance. In conjunction with 
the state's registration requirements and safety inspections, 
the VIN helps to ensure that automobile operators are driv-
ing safe vehicles. By making auto theft more difficult, the 
VIN safeguards not only property but life and limb. See 33 
Fed. Reg. 10,207 (1968) (noting that stolen vehicles are 
disproportionately likely to be involved in automobile 
accidents). 
To facilitate the VIN's usefulness for these laudable gov-
ernmental purposes, federal law requires that the VIN be 
placed in the plain view of someone outside the automobile: 
"The VIN for passenger cars [manufactured after 1969] 
shall be located inside the passenger compartment. It 
shall be readable, without moving any part of the vehi-
cle, through the vehicle glazing under daylight lighting 
conditions by an observer having 20/20 vision (Snellen) 
whose eye point is located outside the vehicle adjacent to 
the left windshield pillar. Each character in the VIN 
subject to this paragraph shall have a minimum height 
of 4 mm." 49 CFR §571.115 (S 4.6) (1984) (emphasis 
added). 
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 658 (1979), we rec-
ognized the "vital interest" in highway safety and the various 
programs that contribute to that interest. In light of the im-
portant interests served by the VIN, the federal and state 
governments are amply justified in making it a part of the 
web of pervasive regulation that surrounds the automobile, 
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and in requiring its placement in an area ordinarily in plain 
view from outside the passenger compartment. 
B 
A citizen does not surrender all the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile. See Dela-
ware v. Prouse, supra, at 663; Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266, 269 (1973). Nonetheless, the state's 
intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or 
elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation 
unless the area is one in which there is a "constitutionally 
protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, -- (1984); 
Maryland v. M aeon, -- U. S. --, -- (1985). 
The Court has recognized that the physical characteristics 
of an automobile· and its use result in a lessened expectation 
of privacy therein: 
"One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehi-
cle because its function is transportation and . it seldom 
serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal 
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public 
scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its 
occupants and its contents are in plain view." Cardwell 
v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
Moreover, automobiles are justifiably the subject of perva-
sive regulation by the state. Every operator of a motor ve-
hicle must expect that the state, in enforcing its regulations, 
will intrude to some extent upon that operator's privacy: 
"Automobiles, unlike homes, are subject to pervasive 
and continuing governmental regulation and controls, in-
cluding periodic inspection and licensing requirements. 
As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine ve-
hicles when license plates or inspection stickers have ex-
pired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or ex-
cessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety 
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equipment are not in proper working order." South Da-
kota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 368 (1976). 
See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 441-442 (1973); 
California v. Carney, supra, at--. 
The factors that generally diminish the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in automobiles are applicable a fortiori to the 
VIN. As we have discussed above, the VIN plays an impor-
tant part in the pervasive regulation by the government of 
the automobile. A motorist must surely expect that such 
regulation will on occasion require the State to determine the 
VIN of his or her vehicle, and the individual's reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby diminished. 
This is especially true in the case of a driver who has commit-
ted a traffic violation. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 
659 ("The foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle 
safety regulations . . . is acting upon observed violations. 
Vehicle stops for traffic violations occur countless times each 
day; and on these occasions, license and registration papers 
are subject to inspection and drivers without them will be as-
certained.") (emphasis added). In addition, it is unreason-
able to have an expectation of privacy in an object required 
by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from 
the exterior of the automobile. The VIN's mandated visibil-
ity makes it more similar to the exterior of the car than to the 
trunk or glove compartment. The exterior of a car, of 
course, is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it 
does not constitute a "search." See Cardwell v. Lewis, 
supra, at 588-589. In sum, because of the important role 
played by the VIN in the pervasive governmental regulation 
of the automobile and the efforts by the federal government 
to ensure that the VIN is placed in plain view, we hold that 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN. 
We think it makes no difference that the papers in respond-
ent's car obscured the VIN from the plain view of the officer. 
We have recently emphasized that efforts to restrict access 
to an area do not generate a reasonable expectation of pri-
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vacy where none would otherwise exist. See Oliver v. 
United States, supra, at-- (placement of "No Trespassing" 
signs on secluded property does not create "legitimate pri-
vacy interest" in marijuana fields). Here, where the object 
at issue is an identification number behind the transparent 
windshield of an automobile driven upon the public roads, we 
believe that the placement of the obscuring papers was insuf-
ficient to create a privacy interest in the VIN. The mere 
viewing of the formerly obscured VIN was not, therefore, a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
c 
The evidence that respondent sought to have suppressed 
was not the VIN, however, but a gun, the handle of which 
the officer saw from the interior of the car while reaching for 
the papers that covered the VIN. While the interior of an 
automobile is not subject to the same expectations of privacy 
that exist with respect to one's home; a car's interior as a 
whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protec-
tion from unreasonable intrusions by the police. We agree 
with the New York Court of Appeals that the intrusion into 
that space con~tituted a "search." 63 N. Y.2d, at 495, 472 
N. E. 2d, at 1011. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 653 
("stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants consti-
tute a 'seizure' . . . even though the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention quite brief"). We must 
decide, therefore, whether this search was constitutionally 
permissible. 
If respondent had remained in the car, the police would 
have been justified in asking him to move the papers obscur-
ing the VIN. New York law authorizes a demand by officers 
to see the VIN, see 63 N. Y.2d, at 496-497, 472 N. E. 2d, at 
1012-1013, and even if the .state law were not explicit on this 
point we have no difficulty in concluding that a demand to in-
spect the VIN, like a demand to see license and registration 
papers, is within the scope of police authority pursuant to a 
84-1181-0PINION 
NEW YORK v. CLASS 9 
traffic violation stop. See Prouse, supra, at 659. If re-
spondent had stayed in his vehicle and acceded to such a 
request from the officer, the officer would not have needed 
to intrude into the passenger compartment. Respondent 
chose, however, to exit the vehicle without removing the pa-
pers that covered the VIN; the officer chose to conduct his 
search without asking respondent to return to the car. We 
must therefore decide whether the officer acted within the 
bounds of the Fourth Amendment in conducting the search. 
We hold that he did. 
Keeping the driver of a vehicle in the car during a routine 
traffic stop is probably the typical police practice. See D. 
Schultz and D. Hunt, Traffic' Investigation and Enforcement 
17 (1983). Nonetheless, out of a concern for the safety of the 
police, the Court has held that officers may, consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment, exercise their discretion to require a 
driver who commits a traffic violation to exit the vehicle even 
though they lack any particularized reason for believing the 
driver possesses a weapon. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
U. S. 106, 108-111 (1977) (per curiam). While we impute to 
respondent no propensity for violence, and while we are con-
scious of the fact that respondent here voluntarily left the ve-
hicle, the facts of this case may be used to illustrate one of the 
principal justifications for the discretion given police officers 
by Pennsylvania v. Mimms: while in the driver's seat, re-
spondent had a loaded pistol at hand. Mimms allows an offi-
cer to guard against that possibility by requiring the driver 
to exit the car briefly. Clearly, Mimms also allowed the offi-
cers here to detain respondent briefly outside the car that he 
voluntarily exited while they completed their investigation. 
The question remains, however, as to whether the officers 
could not only effect the seizure of respondent necessary to 
detain him briefly outside the vehicle, but also effect a search 
for the VIN that may have been necessary only because of 
that detention. The pistol beneath the seat did not, of 
course, disappear when respondent closed the car door be-
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hind him. To have returned respondent immediately to the 
automobile would have placed the officers in the same situa-
tion that the holding in Mimms allows officers to avoid-per-
mitting an individual being detained to have possible access 
to a dangerous weapon and the benefit of the partial conceal-
ment provided by the car's exterior. See Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, supra, at 110. In light of the danger to the officers' 
safety that would have been presented by returning respond-
ent immediately to his car, we think the search to obtain the 
VIN was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 
The Fourth Amendment by its terms prohibits "unreason-
able" searches and seizures. We have noted that 
"there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] 
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] en-
tails.' Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 
534-535, 536-537 (1967). And in justifying the particu-
lar intrusion the police officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, justifiably warrant 
that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968) 
(footnote omitted) (brackets as in Terry). 
This test generally means that searches must be conducted 
pursuant to a warrant backed by probable cause. See 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 105-109 (1965); 
United States v. Karo, --U.S.--,-- (1984). When 
a search or seizure has as its immediate object a search for a 
weapon, however, we have struck the balance to allow the 
weighty interest in the safety of police officers to justify war-
rantless searches based only on a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972). Such searches 
are permissible despite their substantial intrusiveness. See 
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 24-25 (search was "a severe, though 
brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and . . . 
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must surely [have] b[een] an annoying, frightening, and per-
haps humiliating experience"). 
When the officer's safety is less directly served by the de-
tention, something more than objectively justifiable suspicion 
is necessary to justify the intrusion if the balance is to tip in 
favor of the legality of the governmental intrusion. In 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, at 107, the officers had per-
sonally observed the seized individual in the commission of a 
traffic offense before requesting that he exit his vehicle. In 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 693 (1981), the officers 
had obtained a warrant to search the house that the person 
seized was leaving when they came upon him. While the 
facts in Pennsylvania v. Mimms and Michigan v. Summers 
differ in some respects from the facts of this case, the similar-
ities are strong enough that the balancing of governmental 
interests against governmental intrusion undertaken in those 
cases is also appropriate here. All three of the factors in-
volved in Mimms and Summers are present in this case: the 
safety of the officers was served by the governmental intru-
sion; the intrusion was minimal; and the search stemmed 
from some probable cause focusing suspicion on the individual 
affected by the search. Indeed, here the officer's probable 
cause stemmed from directly observing respondent commit a 
violation of the law. 
When we undertake the necessary balancing of "the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against the importance of the govern-
mental interests alleged to justify the intrusion," United 
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 703 (1983), the conclusion that 
the search here was permissible follows. As we recognized 
in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 658, the governmental in-
terest in highway safety served by obtaining the VIN is of 
the first order, and the particular method of obtaining the 
VIN here was justified by a concern for the officer's safety. 
The "critical" issue of the intrusiveness of the government's 
action, United States v. Place, supra, at 722 (BLACKMUN, J., 
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concurring in the judgment), also here weighs in favor of al-
lowing the search. The search was focused in its objective 
and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objective. 
The search was far less intrusive than a formal arrest, which 
would have been permissible for a traffic offense under New 
York law, seeN. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 155 (McKin-
ney 1970 & 1984-1985 Pocket Part); id., Criminal Procedure 
Law, § 140.10(1) (1981), and little more intrusive than a de-
mand that the respondent-under the eyes of the officers-
move the papers himself. The VIN, which was the clear ini-
tial objective of the officer, is by law present in one of two 
· locations-either inside the door jamb, or atop the dashboard 
and thus ordinarily in plain view of someone outside the auto-
mobile. Neither of those locations is subject to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The officer here checked both those 
locations, and only those two locations. The officer did not 
root about the interior of the respondent's automobile before 
proceeding to examine the VIN. He did not reach into any 
compartments or open any containers. He did not even in-
trude into the interior at all until after he had checked the 
door jamb for the VIN. When he did intrude, the officer 
simply reached directly for the unprotected space where the 
VIN was located to move the offending papers. We hold 
that this search was sufficiently unintrusive to be constitu-
tionally permissible in light of the lack of a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the VIN and the fact that the officers ob-
served respondent commit two traffic violations. Any other 
conclusion would expose police officers to potentially grave 
risks without significantly reducing the intrusiveness of the 
ultimate conduct-viewing the VIN-which, as we have said, 
the officers were entitled to do as part of an undoubtedly jus-
tified traffic stop. 
We note th~t our holding today does not authorize police 
qfficers to enter a vehicle to obtain a dashboard-mounted 
VIN when the VIN is visible from outside the automobile. 
If the VIN is in the plain view of someone outside the vehicle, 
• 
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there is no justification for governmental intrusion into the 
passenger compartment to see it.* 
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
*Petitioner invites us to hold that respondent's status as an unlicensed 
driver deprived him of any reasonable expectations of privacy in the vehi-
cle, because the officers would have been within their discretion to have 
prohibited respondent from driving the car away, to have impounded the 
car, and to have later conducted an inventory search thereof. Cf. South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976) (police may conduct inventory 
search of car impounded for multiple parking violations); Nix v. Williams, 
467 U. S. 431 (1984) (discussing the "inevitable discovery" exception to the 
exclusionary rule). Petitioner also argues that there can be no Fourth 
Amendment violation here because the police could have arrested respond-
ent, seeN. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law,§ 155 (McKinney 1970 & 1984-1985 
Pocket Part); id., Criminal Procedure Law, § 140.10(1) (1981), and could 
then have searched the passenger compartment at the time of arrest, cf. 
New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. · 454 (1981),· or arrested respondent and 
searched the car after impounding it pursuant to the arrest, see Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973). We do not", however, reach those 
questions here. 
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